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Abstract. Richard Little’s new book has considerably widened the scope for thinking about
the balance of power in International Relations (IR), both by beginning to provide a
conceptual history of the idea and by expanding existing balance-of-power models. His
concept of the associational balance of power is an important corrective to the prevailing
realist understanding of the balance of power. However, Little does not explore more fully
the relationship between the balance of power as a myth and a reality. Moreover, the
usefulness of distinction between adversarial and association balance of power is not given
a direct evaluation against the historical record, nor is his own composite model of the
balance of power partly based on the distinction fully developed.
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For a long time the concept and theory of the balance of power has captured
the imagination of International Relations (IR) scholars and foreign policy
practitioners alike. It is certainly the most fundamental and cherished idea within
realism. Richard Little’s book is the latest attempt to explore the balance of power
in IR theory, and he does this in a very sophisticated and original way. An
especially noteworthy and valuable aspect of the book is that, in contrast to a
number of recent works which still seek to test balance-of-power theories as found
in realism against historical evidence,
1 Little has begun to oﬀer us a refreshing
conceptual history of the balance of power by providing a new (albeit incomplete)
genealogy of the idea. The book thus represents a truly novel approach to studying
the balance of power in IR theory and practice.
* I wish to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
article.
1 See, for example, T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michael Fortmann (eds), Balance of power: Theory
and Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004); Randall L.
Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2006); and Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little, and William C. Wohlforth (eds), The
Balance of Power in World History (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). For a review of these
works, see Daniel H. Nexon, ‘The Balance of Power in the Balance’, World Politics, 61:2 (April
2009), pp. 330–59.
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641Little sets out to develop a theoretical framework that ‘identiﬁes and accounts
for the important and remarkably distinctive role that the balance of power plays
in IR’ (p. 12). Two central questions seem to have guided the study. First, how can
one conceive of the balance of power in IR? Second, why has the balance of power
emerged and persisted as a central and complex concept in IR despite the
surrounding controversy (p. 13)? He attempts to answer these questions by
developing a balance of power framework based on metaphors, myths and models,
by analysing four canonical texts,
2 and by formulating a composite view of the
balance of power himself.
The book makes a number of distinctive contributions, yet also suﬀers from
some notable ﬂaws. In addition to providing an interesting genealogy of the
balance of power, another important aspect of the book is the distinction Little
makes between an adversarial balance of power and an associational balance of
power.
3 It draws on Hedley Bull’s well-known distinction between international
system and international society.
4 Little has also self-consciously tried to bridge the
American realist and English school perspectives on the balance of power from the
start. But although he has created much space for a more pluralistic conception of
the balance of power, his own composite model oﬀered at the end of book is
underdeveloped. A second weakness of book lies in his unconvincing attempt to
portray the balance of power as a myth both in European political history and in
the four theoretical texts he examines. In fact, the idea of the balance of power as
a political myth could have been one of the most important contributions of the
book. But in the end one is left unsure about the extent to which the balance of
power has been a European myth.
The balance metaphor and the concept of power
Little approaches the ﬁrst question – how to conceive of the balance of power –
by treating it ﬁrst as a metaphor. The metaphors for adversarial and associational
balances of power are ‘a set of scales’ (p. 40) and ‘arch/body’ (p. 67) respectively.
It is in Chapter 2 on metaphors and Chapter 3 on the relationship between the
balance of power as metaphors, myths and models that Little begins to oﬀer an
interesting though somewhat thin and incomplete conceptual history of the balance
of power. In doing so he has carried forward earlier works by Vagts, Wright,
Sheehan, and others.
5
2 The four texts are: Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,
5th edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973); Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of
Order in World Politics, 3rd edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002); Kenneth Waltz, Theory of
International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); and John J. Mearsheimer, The
Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001).
3 Speciﬁcally, an adversarial balance of power means a situation where ‘great powers monitor the
material power possessed by all the other states in the international system and endeavour to
manipulate the resulting distribution of power in their own favour as a means of enhancing their
chances of survival’ (p. 11). By contrast, an associational balance of power means a situation where
great powers recognise that ‘they have a collective responsibility to maintain order in the
international society and that as a consequence they are required to establish and maintain the
balance of power’ (p. 12).
4 Bull, The Anarchical Society.
5 Alfred Vagts, ‘The Balance of Power: Growth of an Idea’, World Politics, 1 (1948), pp. 82–101; M.
Wright, The Theory and Practice of the Balance of Power (London: 1975); Michael Sheehan, The
Balance of Power: History & Theory (London: Routledge, 1996).
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out, scholars have rarely explored the implication of such a treatment (p. 30).
However, his attempt to spell out the implication by drawing on the cognitive
linguistic literature on metaphor seems to have introduced complication and
confusion into his discussion on power. He argues that the balance metaphor has
a transformative impact on the concept of power (p. 48). Speciﬁcally, ‘it moves us
away from an agency-based conception of power and towards a structural
conception of power. It tells us less about the power possessed by the participants
as agents and more about how the power possessed by the members of the system
deﬁnes the structure of the social setting’ (p. 47).
However, if we distinguish between ‘power’ and ‘the balance of power’ as two
distinct concepts, then it is easy to see that, while power can be deﬁned in a variety
of ways – as an attribute or property,
6 a relation,
7 or a structure
8 – the balance
of power is usually regarded as a structural conception in the IR literature. Its
many meanings notwithstanding, it generally refers to a particular distribution of
power in the international system. And systemic power distribution is a structural
concept. It is not clear why we need to rely on the role of metaphor in order to
understand the balance of power as a structural notion. While Little’s discussion
on the balance metaphor is interesting and original, he seems to have reached a
familiar conclusion via an unconventional way. And while it is perhaps true that
most IR theorists have failed to appreciate the metaphorical signiﬁcance of the
balance of power concept, most IR theorists would surely recognise it as a
structural notion.
The balance of power: what myth?
Next Little tries to establish the ‘mythopoeic’ status of the balance of power.
Following a post-positivist perspective, he argues that the reason why positivists
have attempted to build balance-of-power models is because ‘for the past ﬁve
centuries the international balance of power has been inextricably linked to a
political myth, that has become progressively more deeply rooted, that associates
the concept with the stability and survival of a system of independent states’ (pp.
60–1). The myth is told in terms of ideological narratives that depict how a
political equilibrium will emerge to preserve the independence of individual states
and ensure the survival of the European states system. Such narratives ‘are deeply
imbedded in the way that Europeans have thought about international politics over
the past ﬁve hundred years’ and they provide positivists with ‘the basis for testable
6 This is traditionally how power is conceived of in IR. Most realists today still favour this conception.
See, for example, Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 191–2; Robert Gilpin, War and Change
in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 13; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy
of Great Power Politics, chap 3.
7 The original formulation is Robert Dahl, ‘The Concept of Power’, Behavioral Science, 2:3, pp.
201–15. But also see Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, ‘Two Faces of Power’, American
Political Science Review, 56:4 (December 1962), pp. 947–52; Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz,
‘Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework’, American Political Science Review, 57:3
(September 1963), pp. 632–42.
8 Steven Lukes discusses this kind of power in his Power: A Radical View, 2nd edition (Basingstoke:
Palgrave, 2005).
Reconceiving the balance of power 643models that yield determinate outcomes’ (p. 61). The balance of power takes on the
characteristics of a political myth ‘because it not only generates an explanation for
what has happened in the past, but it also makes a case for how states should
operate in the future’ (p. 72).
This is an interesting and appealing argument. But Little needs to clarify a bit
more whether he means that the balance of power has been a political myth in
European history or whether he only intends to argue that the four theorists he
examines have been inﬂuenced by a mythical understanding of the balance of
power and hence their own balance-of-power models developed as academic
projects also contain a considerable mythopoeic dimension. In order to make the
myth argument convincing, three steps are needed. First, Little has to provide an
account of the rise and perpetuation of the balance of power as such a myth.
Where did the myth come from? How has it been used and sustained? Second, to
argue that the four theorists have engaged with myth-making, as he does in
Chapters 4–7, he has to identify profound ideological narratives in their models.
Third, to spell out the full implication of treating the balance of power as a myth,
he has to confront the question of whether the balance of power has actually
operated in European political history in practice and if so, how to treat the
relationship between balance of power as a reality and the balance of power as a
myth.
In fact, Little does not take the third step. Admittedly, this is beyond the scope
of the book. But then this is the problem: a more careful research design is needed
to show the mythopoeic element of the balance of power. It seems, however, that
there is ample literature to suggest that the balance of power has been utilised as
a tool of statecraft not only in European history, but also in the history of
American foreign policy.
9 Indeed, Little’s own historical analysis often reveals that
the balance of power has played the role of an essential guide to foreign policy,
particularly in his discussion of the signiﬁcance of the balance of power principle
in the Utrecht settlement of 1713–1714 (p. 271). The relationship between the
balance of power as a reality and a myth is therefore an interesting question to
explore.
As for the ﬁrst step, Little uses Gucciardini’s History of Italy to account for the
origins of the balance of power myth-making, and discusses Churchill’s 1946 Iron
Curtain speech and Bush’s Introduction to the 2002 National Security Strategy to
explore the mythopoeic role of the balance of power in the contemporary world.
These evidence, however, are insuﬃcient and selective. Even from a purely
post-positivist perspective, such an account of the balance-of-power myth is
unconvincing.
Little’s treatment of the second step is somewhat disappointing. At the end of
each chapter in which he analyses a theorist’s work, he devotes a paragraph or two
to pointing out its mythopoeic dimension. But his arguments on their myth-making
are not always convincing. To be sure, from a post-positivist perspective, all IR
works must contain a mythopoeic dimension since there can be no completely
9 See, for example, Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power: A Case History of the
Theory and Practice of One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft (New York: W. W. Norton,
1955); Sheehan, The Balance of Power; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1982); and Christopher Layne, Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy
from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006).
644 Feng Zhangneutral social science work (p. 85). But to argue on the basis of this minimum
standard is neither interesting nor fair to the major arguments of the four works.
For example, Little cites Bull’s concern with international economic and social
injustice and his hope that mankind can endeavour to alleviate these injustices as
evidence of the ideological dimension of Bull’s model (p. 166). Yet in fact Bull has
nowhere said explicitly that the balance of power can or should accomplish such
a task. Moreover, Bull has tried very hard to avoid any political connotation of
his work and strongly cautioned that ‘The search for conclusions that can be
presented as “solutions” or “practical advice” is a corrupting element in the
contemporary study of world politics, which properly understood is an intellectual
activity and not a practical one.’
10
On Waltz, Little says that there are two aspects to his ideological stance. The
ﬁrst is an aversion to war and a recognition that the main justiﬁcation of the state
is to ensure the security of its inhabitants (p. 211). The second is that Waltz invests
the balance of power ‘with the same moral value that Europeans ascribed to it in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – it prevents the monopolization of power’
(p. 212). These might be Waltz’s view, but whether they can be properly called
myth depends on one’s deﬁnition of ‘myth’ and the extent to which such ‘myth’ has
aﬀected Waltz’s scholarly eﬀort still needs to be determined. Waltz’s conception of
the balance of power, it seems, is overtly mechanistic and corresponds most clearly
to what Inis Claude has called the ‘automatic’ version of the balance of power.
11
It almost appears that what Little means by ‘myth’ is really a theorist’s view
about the nature of an international problem and how to deal with it. Such a
deﬁnition would make all IR writings myths.
12 Curiously, the balance of power as
a myth is only given passing mention in the concluding chapter in which Little
attempts to develop his own composite balance-of-power model. And the mention
actually contradicts Little’s earlier views. Now he says that ‘the metaphorical and
mythical thinking has only provided a springboard which has propelled each
theorist along a rather diﬀerent trajectory’ (p. 280). So they are not engaged in
myth-making after all? Furthermore, in the ﬁnal chapter Little in fact applies a
historical analysis to show that both adversarial and associational balances of
power have in practice played important roles in European history. He uses this
fact as one basis of his model. So the balance of power is not myth after all?
Finally, given his myth argument, one might ask whether Little is also engaged in
a sort of myth-making in developing his own balance-of-power model. It seems
that the relationship between the balance of power as a metaphor, a myth and a
model has not been brought together and suﬃciently explicated in the book’s
conclusion.
The balance of power in four canonical texts
In Chapters 4–7, Little tries to evaluate the four canonical texts in IR theory in
terms of the role of the balance of power in these theories. His analysis is original
10 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 308.
11 Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), chap. 3.
12 But perhaps this is what some post-positivists think.
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assessment of Morgenthau is refreshing. Morgenthau’s work is often criticised for
its vagueness and inconsistency. Little, by applying his distinction between the
adversarial and associational balance of power, oﬀers a very diﬀerent assessment.
He discerns two dynamic processes in Morgenthau’s model, roughly corresponding
to the adversarial and associational balance of power. Thus, Morgenthau is no
longer seen as confused or inconsistent. Moreover, he comes up with the interesting
observation that ‘Politics Among Nations can be viewed as a proto-constructivist
text that focuses on how international politics has undergone seismic changes as
the result of fundamental shifts in the dominant beliefs of the age’ (p. 93).
Little also oﬀers some interesting insights on Bull’s model. Bull’s approach is
seen as providing a bridge between the classical realism of Morgenthau and the
neo-realism of Waltz (p. 129). Bull and Morgenthau have ‘a surprising amount of
overlap’ in their views about the balance of power because they are both aware
of the distinction between adversarial and associational approaches to the balance
of power (pp. 129–30). According to Little, although Bull initially stipulates that
the institutional structure of the European international society was underpinned
by the balance of power, in practice all ﬁve institutions (the balance of power,
international law, diplomacy, war, and great power management) are mutually
interdependent (p. 128). Of great value is Little’s extrapolation from Bull a more
elaborate model of the balance of power that he argues is hidden in Bull’s text (p.
131). But here the discussion becomes quite complicated. On the one hand, he
implies that Bull’s distinction between a fortuitous and contrived balance of power
corresponds to his distinction between an adversarial and an associational balance
of power. On the other hand, in the more elaborate model he extrapolates from
Bull, the contrived balance of power subsumes both the adversarial and associa-
tional balances of power. Presumably this is because the system/society distinction
comes into play in both cases. But the sophistication of the analysis seems to have
reduced the clarity of the argument.
Little’s assessment of Waltz is in many ways favourable when compared with
the scathing criticisms levelled at Waltz in the past. It is also provocative and, in
my opinion, somewhat misleading in a few places. First, he argues that Waltz’s
logic reveals the potential for an associational balance of power to emerge (p. 167).
Second, he believes that Waltz’s model ‘points the way to the emergence of a
unipolar system and the absence of any sustained discussion of unipolarity
represents, as a consequence, a signiﬁcant weakness of Theory of International
Politics’ (p. 167). Both views are questionable.
First, when Little argues that what Waltz calls ‘an increasingly solid bipolar
balance’ ‘reﬂects the existence of an associational rather than an adversarial
balance of power’ (p. 208), he overlooks the context of Waltz’s remark. Waltz is
writing about the US’ and the Soviet Union’s increasingly regularised responses to
each other’s actions as the Cold War proceeded. This shows the regularised
competition between the two superpowers rather than any recognition on their part
that they had a collective responsibility to maintain the balance of power, which is
what an associational balance of power requires. Although the last chapter of
Waltz’s book is entitled ‘the management of international aﬀairs’, its main theme
is the diﬃculties and possibilities of managing international aﬀairs – not something
that an associational balance of power should suggest.
646 Feng ZhangSecond, Little uses the quote from Waltz that ‘the question to ask is not
whether a third or fourth country will enter the circle of great powers in the
foreseeable future but rather whether the Soviet Union can keep up’ as evidence
that the logic of Waltz’s approach should have encouraged him to explore the
implication of unipolarity (pp. 188–9).
13 Again he overlooks the context. Waltz is
examining the durability of the bipolar world. That the Soviet Union might have
diﬃculty keeping up with the US is only a minor point he makes. And it should
not obscure his larger point that ‘middle powers who try to compete [with the two
superpowers] ﬁnd themselves constantly falling behind’ and ‘the barriers to entering
the superpower club have never been higher and more numerous’.
14
Might Little’s conjecture that Waltz ‘might have been more willing to entertain
the possibility of an enduring unipolar world’ (p. 189) nevertheless be correct? But
for Waltz to entertain the possibility of unipolarity is also for him to renounce his
own balance-of-power model. The theory of Theory of International Politics is that
balances of power will recurrently form. If Waltz accepted the possibility or even
the durability of unipolarity, then his theoretical ediﬁce would have to collapse. It
is more likely that, if Waltz were to elaborate on the possibility of the Soviet
Union’s exit from the superpower club, he would have argued that other states
would emerge to balance the US and thus create a new balance of power. Contrary
to what Little believes, it is not surprising to ﬁnd Waltz think that unipolarity is
‘unnatural’. Unipolarity cannot have a place in Waltz’s theory. In fact, Waltz has
consistently maintained this position since the end of the Cold War.
15 His failure
to bring unipolarity into focus is true to his theoretical commitment, rather than
‘an anomaly in his thinking’ (p. 268). In both cases, then, Little has seized the
minor points Waltz makes which do not have the larger implication Little
claims.
In addition, when discussing Waltz’s view on power, Little also seems to have
created unnecessary confusion. He says that Waltz wants to establish a structural
concept of power (p. 181). What Waltz tries to do in fact is to deﬁne the third
component of international structure in terms of the distribution of power across
states. And he deﬁnes a state’s power simply in terms of its capabilities. As he puts
it, ‘To use power is to apply one’s capabilities in an attempt to change someone
else’s behavior in certain ways.’
16 Waltz’s agential conception of power is much
like other realists’ view.
17 Later in the book, Little acknowledges that ‘Waltz
and Mearsheimer agree that power needs to be deﬁned in terms of capabilities [. . .]’
(p. 223).
13 As Little says, ‘If the answer to this question had been that the Soviet Union could not keep up,
then the implication that followed from Waltz’s analysis was crystal clear: bipolarity would give way
to unipolarity. Given this assessment, it was remiss of Waltz not to open up the question of
unipolarity.’ (p. 188).
14 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 181, 183.
15 Kenneth Waltz, ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’, International Security, 18:2 (Fall
1994), pp. 44–79; and Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, International Security, 25:1
(Summer 2000), pp. 5–41.
16 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 191. He says in a later article that ‘Power in neorealist
theory is simply the combined capability of a state.’ See Waltz, ‘Realist Thought and Neorealist
Theory’, Journal of International Aﬀairs, 44:1 (Spring 1990), pp. 21–37, at p. 36.
17 Mearsheimer, for example, says that ‘Power [...] represents nothing more than speciﬁc assets or
material resources that are available to states.’ See Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics,p .5 7 .
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tions. He uses the treadmill metaphor to argue that the oﬀensive/defensive
distinction is not helpful for understanding the relationship between Mearsheimer
and Waltz. He argues that Mearsheimer’s theory demonstrates the regional
characteristics of the international system. He praises Mearsheimer’s approach
because it ‘not only moves away from a Eurocentric perspective, it also holds the
potential to provide a distinctive entry point into the analysis of world history’ (p.
216). According to Little, because of the regional focus of Mearsheimer’s theory,
it oﬀers a much more promising vehicle for studying international systems in the
pre-European era of world history (p. 216).
But the overall assessment suﬀers from two shortcomings. First, Little
surprisingly fails to focus on the role of the balance of power in Mearsheimer’s
theory. Indeed he fails to recognise that the balance of power plays no crucial role
in Mearsheimer’s theory, because Mearsheimer simply deﬁnes it as ‘the actual
distribution of military assets among the great powers in the system’.
18 It is
essential to recognise that oﬀensive realism is not balance-of-power theory. In
contrast to Waltz, Mearsheimer claims to develop a theory of foreign policy as well
as of international politics. He makes ﬁve theoretical assumptions (that the
international system is anarchic, that great powers inherently possess some
oﬀensive military capability, that states can never be certain about other states
intentions, that survival is the primary goal of great powers, and that great powers
are rational actors) and argues that when the ﬁve assumptions are married
together, the theory predicts that even security-seeking states will maximise their
relative power. In Mearsheimer’s world the balance of power is simply a structural
condition that states will try to change in their attempts to establish hegemony.
Here as in some other realist theories that emphasise states’ expansion, the concept
of the balance of power merely means any distribution of power in the
international system.
19 In fact, in this chapter Little frequently uses the balance of
power concept in this sense too, but his failure to point out this particular use of
the concept and its largely auxiliary role in Mearsheimer’s theory is a deﬁciency for
a book that seeks to evaluate the balance of power in IR theory.
A minor point is that Little has misinterpreted Mearsheimer’s theoretical
assumptions. He says that Mearsheimer assumes that states aim to survive by
maximising power (pp. 220, 224–5). But in fact Mearsheimer only assumes that
states aim to survive, which is one among his ﬁve assumptions. Only when the ﬁve
assumptions are taken together can the theory have the behavioural implication
that states will maximise their relative power.
20
The balance of power and unipolarity
In the concluding chapter Little develops a composite view of the balance of
power. His approach is pluralistic, drawing on realism, English school and
18 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,p .2 ,f n .3 .
19 Another example is Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981).
20 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 31–2.
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insights on the balance of power. The composite view integrates three dimensions:
system/society divide, polarity, and geography (p. 257), thus developing into a
more expansive conception of the balance of power. For this Little deserves praise:
not only is it diﬃcult to attempt theoretical synthesis but sometimes scholars’
willingness to do so is in doubt.
21
But how valuable is this composite view? Little acknowledges that it only
provides a research framework and not yet a theory (p. 281). He nevertheless
implies that the composite view, though underdeveloped, can potentially account
for some persistent anomalies in International Relations. For example, given the
collapse of the Soviet Union, why has the US not yet pulled out of Europe and
Japan? Why has the Eurasian great powers not tried to balance the US in the
post-Cold War era? He suggests that the anomalies arise out of a purely systemic
– that is, realist – perspective on the balance of power. If one adds the societal –
that is, English school – dimension, then the anomalies disappear, because a US
withdraw ‘would reﬂect a lack of solidarity with other members of the western
international society and potentially encourage them to think in terms of an
adversarial balance of power’ (p. 279). Little is in fact implying that an
associational balance of power can somehow explain the anomaly of unipolarity in
realist balance-of-power theory (pp. 282–3).
This is certainly a plausible argument, though Little fails to engage more fully
with recent realist attempts to account for the stability of unipolarity.
22 He also
does not pay suﬃcient attention to varied responses (including forms of ‘soft
balancing’) of states like China and Russia in reaction to American unipolarity in
the post-Cold War period. More importantly, however, his argument raises a
general problem with the concept of the associational balance of power.
Little argues that an associational balance of power among the Western powers
has prevented the adversarial balance of power from forming among them. But
here the associational balance of power no longer refers to a political equilibrium
or a more or less even distribution of power. It apparently refers to post-Cold War
unipolarity centred on the US. Indeed, although at times Little uses the
associational balance of power to indicate the recognition on the part of the
European great powers of their collective responsibility to maintain ‘a political
equilibrium’ (p. 86), the term frequently refers to any distribution of power agreed
upon by the major powers in an international system (pp. 68, 73, 272, 274). But
if associational balance of power can mean the inter-subjective consent on
unipolarity or any other distribution of power among the major powers, then the
concept will encounter the classic problem associated with the old balance of power
concept, namely, it is not clear what kind of power distribution it refers to. In
Little’s usage, it seems to refer to any intersubjectively agreed upon distribution of
power. This may not be a troubling issue to Little since he is fully aware of the
protean character of the balance of power concept and since he has ﬁrst treated the
balance of power as a metaphor. But perhaps here he can be more explicit and
21 For an argument on the importance of ‘analytical eclecticism’ that combines diﬀerent theoretical
approaches in IR, see Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, ‘Japan, Asian-Paciﬁc Security, and
the Case for Analytical Eclecticism’, International Security, 26:3 (Winter 2001/2002), pp. 153–85.
22 An important such attempt is William C. Wohlforth, ‘The Stability of a Unipolar World’,
International Security, 24:1 (Summer 1999), pp. 5–41.
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moved quite close in meaning to great power management in English School
theory, albeit compounded with a constructivist ideational perspective. Indeed, in
the last paragraph of the book (p. 287) Little seems to be using the two terms
interchangeably.
A related point is that, with the associational balance of power so conceived,
it seems that Little’s explanation of unipolarity relies primarily on a constructivist
ideational explanation, rather than on any distinctive balance-of-power mechanism.
One might wonder whether this has served to metamorphose the research question.
Little needs to clarify whether the concept of associational balance of power still
retains the classical English School understanding of the balance of power (which
to me conveys a sense of a ‘political equilibrium’ as its outcome) or whether it has
simply become an inter-subjective agreement on any international distribution of
power, which sounds more constructivist than English School. Otherwise, his claim
that the associational balance of power can explain unipolarity would not only be
underdeveloped but also confusing.
One ﬁnal point may be made on the book’s research design. There seems to be
a hidden tension between Little’s post-positivist attempt to portray the balance of
power as a metaphor and a myth and his somewhat positivist attempt to develop
his own model of the balance of power to account for world politics. As a result,
although the book contains many refreshing interpretations and original insights,
somehow some of the most interesting arguments have not been developed very
far. His myth argument is one example of this. Another example is the very
valuable distinction between adversarial and associational balance of power. But
Little only discusses the distinction in the light of others’ works rather than trying
to develop a framework or theory on the basis of this distinction and then evaluate
it with historical evidence. How exactly has the balance of power worked in the
practice of International Relations? Since Little’s focus is more on the role of the
balance of power in contemporary IR theoretical texts, he does not provide a direct
answer to this question. But it seems that, in the light of his wide-ranging
discussion, much work still needs to be done on this basic and central question in
European statecraft. In the end of course he develops a composite model of the
balance of power, but it is underdeveloped in the sense that how the three
dimensions he identiﬁes (system/society divide, polarity, and geography) are
supposed to work together in a causal network is unspeciﬁed.
Conclusion
In sum, Little has considerably widened the scope for thinking about the balance
of power in IR, both by beginning to provide a conceptual history of the idea and
by expanding existing balance-of-power models. The book also oﬀers a succinct
and refreshing textual exegesis of the four canonical texts in IR theory. His concept
of the associational balance of power is an important corrective to the prevailing
realist understanding of the balance of power. It reminds us that the balance of
power is not just an unintended natural process, as some realists would have it, but
can be based on the norms of international society.
650 Feng ZhangHowever, while Little’s interesting but incomplete genealogy of the balance of
power idea has generated important new research angles, it also raises questions as
he does not explore more fully the relationship between the balance of power as
a myth and a reality. Moreover, the usefulness of distinction between adversarial
and association balance of power is not given a direct evaluation against the
historical record, nor is his own composite model partly based on the distinction
fully developed. This suggests that much work still needs to be done if one is to
follow his approach. Little is most successful in discussing the similarities and
diﬀerences among the four theorists’ models of the balance of power. In delivering
a sophisticated textual exegesis, he also succeeds in analysing the complicated role
of the balance of power in contemporary IR theory.
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